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1. The “anticipatory adaptation” of the CEECs
From the beginning of the 1990s, the new market economies of Cen­
tral and Eastern Europę (CEE) have seen economic growth and EU 
membership, i.e. marketisation and harmonisation with EU norms, as 
public goods, as “official discourses” and “valens issues”, i.e. issues on 
which all parties and elite groups declare the same objective, but dispute 
each other’s competence in achieving the desired policy” [Innes, 2002, 
85], thereby shaping a path-dependency and a “transition in the (already 
on-going) transition”. The political elites have seemed willing to accept 
EU membership as an a priori good thing.
Thus, futurę EU membership has been a “top-priority” subject among 
the political elites in the CEE countries, thereby signifying that these 
countries wish to “return to Europę” and, as it was hoped, at the same 
time “catch up” with the West, both economically and socially. The struc- 
tural conditions from outside, that means the demands put forward by 
the IMF and EU, have been extremely strict and therefore difficult to 
meet. Dismantling the command economy has been unexpectedly diffi­
cult to manage. Before long politicians faced shrinking public budgets 
combined with a huge increase in demand. Just as the economic crisis 
receded in the most successful economies, a new set of policy constraints 
emerged, as the EU applicant countries had to fulfil the EU accession re- 
ąuirements, the “Copenhagen criteria” adopted at the EU Copenhagen 
summit in 1993, i.e. a functioning and competitive market economy, 
a Western European style political democracy, efficient administration
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(also named “the Madrid criterion”), a transparent justice system and ef- 
fective law enforcement. As rightly noted by Attila Agh [Agh, 2002], in 
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy and the on- 
going adaptation to the EU, the applicant countries faced a double chal­
lenge, globalisation and europisation.
Furthermore, the adaptation to the EU was “anticipatory” in the 
sense that the applicant countries introduced EU laws and rules, expect- 
ing EU accession, but without any guarantee that the expectations re- 
garding membership would be fulfilled. In spite of the fact that most pol- 
iticians from the EU expressed a broad commitment to enlargement, 
there was in fact been no binding commitment. In addition, uncertainty 
increased due to the lack of trust on both sides and the absence of enthu- 
siasm from the side of the voters in the EU, especially in countries like 
Germany and Austria, where the degree of knowledge about the state 
and impact of enlargement has, in generał, been rather Iow, e.g. regard- 
ing the movement of labour from East to West.
From the outset, each applicant state had to demonstrate a good re- 
cord on almost everything from the banking sector to human rights, har- 
monise its relevant national legislation with EU regulations, i.e. adopt 
in fuli the EU “aquis communautaire”, the existing rules, regulations 
and agreements of the European Union. In the yearly “progress reports” 
the EU Commission madę elear several times that the ratę of adapting 
to EU law was inadequate. At least in principle, the aquis commu­
nautaire had to be fully implemented before joining the EU. However, 
this demand has been impossible to fulfil and gave rise to inereasing 
“euro-scepticism” and “euro-realism” in the applicant countries. This re- 
quirement might, if followed in fuli, have posed serious budgetary prob- 
lems for all the acceding States, as the contributions to the EU budget 
from the side of the accession countries has to be paid from the state 
budgets, while most money from the EU goes to municipalities and the 
regional level or to farmers [Innes, 2002, 90].
In addition, EU enlargement has met with “mixed feelings” among the 
EU-15 countries. From the outset, in the Scandinavian countries the en­
largement of the EU was met with great enthusiasm for obvious 
geo-strategic, historical and economic reasons. In the case of the South­
ern European countries the Southern dimension and the deepening of 
the EU had a higher priority. For this reason, the negotiations on en­
largement were brought to a stand still at the end of the 1990s. After the 
Nice summit in December 2000 and the adoption of the new “road map” 
the negotiations were speeded up, thus moving the negotiation process 
from a standstill to the “end gamę”, that culminated with the EU sum­
mit in Copenhagen in December 2002. The accession treaties were
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signed in Athens in April 2003 under the Greek Presidency. However, 
ratification of the treaty required time, and due to this (and for financial 
reasons), it was decided that the ten candidate countries would become 
members of the EU on 1 May 2004.
At the European Union summit in Copenhagen eight “post-commu- 
nist” countries received invitations to join Western Europe’s “exclusive 
club” in mid 2004. However the question is, whether the assimilation of 
thousands of pages of EU law means that the acceding countries had 
also adopted the aquis communautaire at the time of accession. As noted 
by Alan Mayhew [Mayhew, 2000], after EU accession there will be some 
years during which the EU rules and norms (“aquis”) will not be imple- 
mented perfectly by the new EU member states (as in the case of previ- 
ous enlargements and also in the EU-15, not to forget). However, this 
was felt by the present EU countries to be a rather smali cost compared 
to that of delaying enlargement beyond 2004.
According to the decisions taken in Copenhagen, the EU Commission 
may limit the rights of the accession countries, e.g. voting rights and fi­
nancial support in cases of serious flaws in the assimilation of national 
laws and rules to the aquis communautaire. Not to forget, due to the en­
largement of the union, European integration faces two major chal- 
lenges: the issue of EU institutional reform and the issue of how far the 
union’s borders should extend.
2. Some theoretical perspectives
on the negotiations about EU-enlargement
The negotiations about EU enlargement have been studied from dif- 
ferent theoretical perspectives. One theory, called liberał intergouern- 
mentalism, as formulated by Andrew Moravcik, is based on the rational 
choice approach, mainly focusing on the formation of preferences and the 
bargaining power of the governments involved, at the same time 
downplaying the role of the EU Commission in the negotiations. In other 
words, the core of liberał intergovernmentalism is based on three essen- 
tial “assumptions”:
- the assumption of the rational behaviour of states,
- a liberał theory of the formation of national preferences,
- an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation.
The assumption of the rational behauiour of states provides a generał 
framework of analysis, within which the costs and benefits of economic 
interdependence are the primary determinants of national preferences. 
According to Moravcik, the relative intensity of national preferences, the
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existence of alternative coalitions and the opportunity for linking issues 
or “package deals” provide the basis for an intergovernmental analysis of 
the resolution of distributional conflicts among governments” [Moravcik, 
1993, 480—481]. In the case of the enlargement negotiations, the inten- 
sity of the national preferences of the accession countries were high, 
however, the influence capacity of the accession countries were Iow, 
thereby minimizing the prospects of package deals and entering alterna- 
tive coalitions.
The Danish social scientist Lykke Friis has formulated her own 
so-called “Moraocik plus” model, taking Moravcik and liberał intergoven- 
mentalism as the point of departure, but at the same time including 
some qualitative variables by adding neo-institutional explanations, 
thereby underlining the role of the EU Commission in the negotiations 
on enlargement. Seen in this perspective, Lykke Friis distinguishes be- 
tween what she calls the logics and the strategies of negotiations. Among 
the “logics” we find “club logie”, this is illustrated by the fact that before 
finding a common position in the negotiations with the accession coun­
tries the EU-15 had agree among themselues. Therefore, the negotiations 
can be seen as a inside-outside gamę, consisting of at least two “games”, 
first inside the EU-15 (e.g. on formulating common positions) and subse- 
quently outside, i.e. negotiations between the EU-15 and the accession 
countries. This has not been an easy task, especially in the case of the 
agriculture chapter and budget and finance chapters.
Theories about the adaptation of smali States to the European integra- 
tion have focused, among other things, on the so-called “integration di- 
lemma” and seen in this perspective the different strategies and ways of 
adopting followed by smali states to the EU, e.g. strategies of balancing, 
i.e. a high degree of participation and strategies of demands, commit- 
ments, counterweight and concessions, of ąuiescence, i.e. a policy of non- 
commitment and/or acquiescence, i.e. a policy of concessions and strate­
gies of bastions, in which case the countries involved focus on a few sub- 
jects during negotiations [Kelstrup, 1993].
Furthermore, adaptation theory assumes that foreign policy consists 
of policy-makers’ actions manipulating the balance between their society 
(i.e. the internal environment) and their external environment, in order 
to secure the adequate functioning of social structures in situations of in- 
terdependence. This is a conception somewhat similar to the conceptuali- 
sation of foreign policy as a two-level gamę, in which policy-makers try to 
balance their external and internal environments against each other. 
The control capacity is a function of the positive and negative measures 
by which decision-makers may influence their societies on a given issue. 
Adaptation to the external environment can take different forms, de-
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pending on the underlying balance between internal and external fac- 
tors. The foreign policy of a country depends to a great extent on its de- 
gree of control over its external environment, i.e. its capability to 
influence.
In the case of the applicant countries, due to their Iow influence capac- 
ity, the smaller countries tended to follow a bastion strategy, i.e. focus- 
ing on a few topics in the negotiations, in the case of Lithuania the ques- 
tions of nuclear power (Ignalina) and taxation (e.g. taxes on cigarettes) 
were prominent. As the largest accession country, Poland has aimed to 
follow a balancing linę, entering coalitions and trying to profit from its 
relatively high capacity to influence. The forthcoming referenda on EU 
membership will show the extent of the control capacity of the accession 
countries’ governments.
By integration dilemma Morten Kelstrup means the dilemma of an 
“either/or”: either the State gives up a substantial part of its sovereignty 
with the danger of being “entrapped” in the integrated system, i.e. being 
so constrained that it loses its freedom of action and thereby its ability 
to pursue its own interests, or the State insists on its independence with 
the danger of being “abandoned", i.e. not included in the system with the 
disadvantages which might ensue” [Kelstrup, 1993]. We may refer to 
this “logie” as the dialectic of inclusion/exclusion. Seen from the point of 
the applicant countries, the negotiations with the EU have been asym- 
metric with the EU as the clearly strongest negotiating pole and unex- 
pectedly tough negotiating partner, especially when negotiating on the 
most “sensitive” negotiation chapters, e.g. on agricultural policy and the 
budget.
3. The powers of the EU Council Presidency
Regarding the role of the Council Presidency, as rightly noticed by 
Jonas Tallberg [Tallberg, 2002], the existing literaturę is overwhelming 
sceptic. According to most observers, the presidency’s ability to promote 
private concerns has been considered highly limited. Typically, the presi­
dency has been depicted as a “responsibilite sans pouvior”, taking care 
primarily of technical administrative problems. Gradually the role of the 
chairmanship has expanded. Thus looking at e.g. the Swedish and Dan- 
ish EU Chairmanships, the basie and simplified view has to be modified 
not least as regards the enlargement negotiations. Due to the expansion 
of the EU, the rotating EU Chairmanship is expected to be abolished af- 
ter the adoption of the forthcoming EU Constitution.
Each EU Presidency has at least two main tasks. One is to get the 
work done. Ali the proposals on the Council’s table must be dealt with.
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This applies both to matters that have a high political profile and those 
that are important, but do not make headlines in the newspapers. 
Hendrik Voss and Emilie Bailleul [Voss and Bailleul, 2002, 5] both un- 
derline that the European President is in charge of organisational and 
administrative-technical affairs: presiding over debates, signing reports 
and conclusions. It is also the president who decides how much time will 
be devoted to an item on the agenda and when to proceed to the vote. 
Secondly, the president lays down the agenda of the meetings and jointly 
with the Commission, a programme of priorities is developed which 
serves as a basis for the provisional agendas of the Councils. Thirdly, 
and probably most importantly, the president is expected to play 
a mediatory role as well, i.e. seek a common denominator and forge com- 
promises. Fourthly, a president also has a representative function, being 
the face and mouthpiece of the Union in the media, vis-f-vis the other 
European institutions and on the International scene. In these cases, the 
president is assisted by the Commission and especially by the General 
Secretariat of the Council, not only technically, but also substantively. 
Furthermore, the Secretary GeneraFs staff help to work out compro- 
mises. The presidency seems to have focused on structuring the work in 
the Council. Over time the work in the Council has become morę stream- 
lined, with fewer but stronger Council configurations. At the same time 
the meetings of the European Council seem to have been better prepared 
and the agenda drawn up to focus on fewer and morę comprehensive 
measures.
Jonas Tallberg develops a conceptual framework that expands the no- 
tion of influence, by distinguishing between three forms of agenda-shap- 
ing: agenda setting, agenda structuring, and agenda exclusion.
Typically, he argues, influence has been eąuated with the introduction 
of new issues on the agenda, i.e. agenda-setting. In other words, 
agenda-setting refers to the introduction of new issues on the policy 
agenda. In contrast, agenda structuring refers to the emphasising or 
de-emphasising of issues already put on the agenda. Finally, agenda- 
exclusion refers to the active barring of issues from the policy agenda. 
Furthermore, we can distinguish between at least three types of EU 
Chairmanships: the consensual, i.e. aiming at compromises, the entre- 
preneurial, i.e. actively leaving one’s mark on the agenda, and the domi- 
nating, i.e. pushing forward one’s own national interests.
In spite of French ambivalence regarding enlargement, other priori­
ties, the 2002 election and dominant type French EU Chairmanship, e.g. 
manifested during the Nice summit in December 2000, the enlargement 
process was speeded up by the decisions taken at the summit. The “Am­
sterdam leftovers”, the outstanding institutional questions related to the
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enlargement, were in three areas: the size and composition of the Com- 
mission, the possible extension of ąualified majority voting in the Coun- 
cil, and the weighting of votes in the Council. Also the proposals in the 
EU Commission’s “Strategy Paper” from November 2000 regarding 
greater flexibility on the treatment of transition periods, the possibility 
of “setting aside” chapters and a “road map” for the negotiations were ac- 
cepted in Nice.
The Swedish presidency, which followed at the beginning of 2001 was 
expected to be far morę positive towards enlargement than the French, 
but Sweden needed strong allies among other member States to fulfil the 
platform of the presidency. According to the “road map”, it was under 
the Swedish presidency in the first half of 2001 that the finał phase, the 
so-called “end gamę” in the negotiations on enlargement should start.
4. The Danish EU Council Presidency
Denmark took over the EU Presidency from 1 July 2002 to 31 Decem- 
ber 2002. Ninę years before, in 1993 the EU took its first step towards 
enlargement by formulating the so-called “Copenhagen criteria” for fu­
turę EU membership. As mentioned above, over the last ten years the 
candidate countries had to adjust laws and rules to the EU “aquis 
communautaire”, and the EU had to change as well, in order to be ready 
for enlargement. The Danish presidency came at a time when the EU 
was about to enlarge using the “road” map adopted in Nice and after 
four years of tough negotiations. The European Council in Copenhagen 
took place on 12-13 December 2002.
Facts about the presidency
• The member states take in turns to preside the EU.
• The country holding the presidency is to further the EU’s work 
and establish the basis for necessary compromises. At the same 
time the country holding the presidency is to represent the EU re­
garding foreign policy.
• The country holding presidency is to chair EU meetings and host 
EU negotiations.
• As regards the Danish presidency, the biggest meeting was the 
European Council summit of 12-13 December in Copenhagen, 
where the heads of State and government met. i
Source: Danish Foreign Ministry.
2 — Challenges...
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From the outset the Danish presidency was met with some reserva- 
tion from the other EU-15 countries, due to the well-known Danish EU 
scepticism, which was manifested in the Danish opt-out of the 
Maastricht criteria (The Edinburgh agreement). Because of this opt-out, 
Denmark does not take part in any of the following: the supranational 
cooperation regarding legał matters and domestic affairs, EU citizen- 
ship, EU defence cooperation and the common currency, the euro. The 
opt-out had some conseąuences for the Danish EU Presidency. In de­
fence matters Denmark had to relinąuish the presidency. In this case, 
the presidency was taken over by Greece, which was the next country to 
assume the presidency. Moreover, Denmark is not participating in the 
euro and therefore could not assume the presidency of the group of euro 
countries. Finally, Denmark could not take part in decisions, which re- 
gard the opt-out, i.e. regarding legał matters and domestic affairs, but 
Denmark would be able to chair the negotiations.
Nonetheless, and maybe exactly due to this opt-out, the Danish 
government deeply involved itself in the EU chairmanship to show Den­
mark as distinct pro-European country capable of carrying out the en- 
largement and at the same time organise complex interstate nego­
tiations. Another cause of the strong Danish involvement in the 
enlargement process was that EU enlargement had top priority for the 
Danish governments throughout the 1990s, however, provided that the 
enlargement became the “big bang” scenario, i.e. included all applicant 
countries and most or all of the three Baltic States.
The Copenhagen criteria
The candidate countries have to fulfil a number of criteria, in order 
to become members of the EU:
* The political criterion: the country must have a stable democracy, 
respect human rights and minorities.
• The economic criterion: the country must have a well-functioning 
market economy and be strong enough to be competitive in the EU 
Single Market.
• Moreover, the candidate countries have to live up to the commit- 
ments involved in EU membership, among others the adoption and 
application of the EU rules (the “aquis communautaire”)
Furthermore, according to the later Madrid criterion, the candi­
date countries have to built up sufficient administrative capacity to 
be able to implement EU laws and directives.
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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From the beginning, the Danish presidency set morę or less elear 
goals within at least five areas. As said, the enlargement had top prior- 
ity. However, other subjects were also on the agenda and some results 
achieved, including such subjects as liberalisation of the electricity and 
gas markets in the EU, the establishment of a single European airspace 
and adoption of new rules on food safety. A tax package was designed, 
among other things, to ensure fair taxation of interest accrued on sav- 
ings hidden in banks in other countries inside the EU, as well as in key 
countries outside the EU.
With respect to the Middle East issue, the presidency launched 
a number of peace initiatives, however, as in other cases of peace propos- 
als, without any great success. Also, the ąuestion about intensifying the 
EU’s relations with Russia was important. In that respect the Danish 
chairmanship was a failure to some extent, although this was primarily 
due to the Chechen conference that took place in Copenhagen at the 
same time as a Chechen terrorist act in Moscow. In spite of pressure 
from the Russian government, the Danish government refused to cancel 
the conference. For that reason Vladimir Putin refused to take part in 
the EU-Russian summit in Copenhagen. Instead, that meeting with 
Putin took place in Brussels. After long and difficult negotiations, the 
EU summit in Brussels succeeded in reaching a common understanding 
with Russia on the ąuestion about transit of Russian citizens from 
Kaliningrad to Russia after Lithuania and Poland became membership 
of EU. The agreement ensures rather smooth and un-bureaucratic tran­
sit to and from Kaliningrad.
Also, the ąuestion of Turkey became a key issue. At the Copenhagen 
summit it was decided that if the European Council in December 2004, 
on the basis of a report and recommendation by the Commission, deter- 
mines that Turkey fulfils the political criteria from Copenhagen, the Eu­
ropean Union will then initiate accession negotiations with Turkey as 
soon as possible. Cyprus seemed to be about to join the EU as a parti- 
tioned island. The Turkey ąuestion has become a reason for huge debate 
in itself. EU leaders have been split as to when, if at all, Turkey, should 
be given a datę for starting accession negotiations. France and Germany 
started the bali rolling by saying Ankara should be allowed to first start 
negotiations in July 2005. England supported the ąuickest possible 
opening of negotiations, mostly due to the need for Turkey’s cooperation 
in the case of war against Iraq.
At the Copenhagen summit we could also notę agreement on the ąues­
tion about the futurę agreement between NATO and EU concerning se­
curity and defence (ESDP). The EU wanted to reach an agreement with 
NATO on the use of its assets for the EU’s operations, but had until then
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been held up by the conflicting interests of Greece and Turkey. Turkey, 
a NATO member, but not for the foreseeable time an EU member, has 
been concerned about the EU getting access to NATO assets. Further- 
more, during the Danish presidency the EU countries continued the 
work of creating a common asylum policy and strengthening their efforts 
against International crime. The implementation of the EU’s action plan 
for combating terrorism, that started during the Belgium presidency in 
the second half of 2001, continued and police cooperation became 
strengthened, in order to eradicate drug smuggling and child pornogra- 
phy, among other things.
In summary, we can say that the conclusion of the accession negotia- 
tions with the first ten new member States was the Danish EU Presi- 
dency’s greatest task. As enlargement was also popular among the Dan­
ish population, a successful conclusion might increase the Danish 
government’s control capacity by increasing popular support for the EU 
in generał and improving the prospects of getting rid of the Danish 
opt-out at a futurę national referendum. Maybe such a referendum will 
take place at the same time as the referendum on the new EU treaty 
planned to take place in 2004. Thus, the strategy followed by the Danish 
government should be seen as an integral part of the adaptation policy 
primarily aimed at reducing the specific Danish integration dilemma 
and increasing the control capacity that has existed ever sińce accession 
to the EU in 1972.
From the outset of the chairmanship, the Danish presidency drew up 
a strategy for the negotiations, that was aimed at clearing the highest 
possible number of negotiation issues before the meeting of the Euro- 
pean Council in Brussels on 24 and 25 October. This included issues 
such as Estonia’s right to the continued production of oil shale (a special 
Estonian energy resource, extracted by mining), Malta’s right, for a lim- 
ited period of time, to continue giving State aid to certain Industries, in- 
cluding shipyards, and Poland’s ability to comply with the EU rules on 
Justice and Home Affairs (for instance on border control). In the end, the 
strategy proved successful.
At the Brussels summit outstanding ąuestions regarding the financial 
package also had to be dealt with, the negotiation chapter with the high­
est priority and closely linked to the agriculture chapter. An agreement 
was reached concerning the phasing-in of the candidate countries into 
the system of direct payments in the agricultural sector. It was the Dan­
ish Presidency’s goal to reach agreement with the EU member States on 
the price of the enlargement at the EU Council meeting in October. This 
means that also ąuestions of budget compensations were resolved. This 
plan succeeded, at least partly. A decision was madę on the amount that
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the candidate countries are to receive from the EU structural funds. A 
decision was also madę on the phasing-in of the candidate countries into 
the EU system of direct payments to individual farms (with a 10 years 
transition period). In addition, it was decided that no candidate country 
was to be in a poorer position after accession in relation to the EU bud- 
get than before, when they received support from the EU for their acces­
sion preparations.
Immediately before the meeting of the European Council in Brussels, 
the EU Commission presented its annual assessment of the preparations 
by the candidate countries for membership. In that finał progress report 
the Commission concluded that the ten countries had madę so much 
progress in their preparations for EU membership that they would be 
ready for accession by the beginning of 2004. The Brussels European 
Council adopted this assessment. This was the prereąuisite for complet- 
ing the enlargement negotiations. During the period leading to the Co- 
penhagen European Council, the Danish Presidency, together with the 
Commission, conducted intense individual negotiations with the ten can­
didate countries, at the same time respecting the decisions taken at the 
Brussels European Council.
Another issue to be sorted out at the Copenhagen summit was the ac­
cession “roadmap” for Bułgaria and Romania, who will not join the EU 
with the other ten in 2004, but most likely in 2007, maybe later. The fi- 
nancial terms of their accession package had to be agreed by the EU 
leaders.
With the enlargement achieved, the work in the convention will be- 
come a crucial political task for the EU. The aim is to ensure that the fu­
turę EU with 25 member states will also be able to function. Most impor- 
tant is to simplify decision making procedures and emphasise common 
values. The use of ąualified majority voting and the co-decision proce­
durę has to be expanded, the work of the EU has to be morę transparent 
and under morę strict democratic control. The different opinions on the 
war against Iraq underlined stronger Atlanticism and at the same time 
also a soft euro-scepticism among the accession countries, mainly di- 
rected against the French and German plans about creating a “avant- 
garde group” of EU countries and a (semi) federal structure with greater 
influence given to large countries and with the original (“old”) EU-6 
countries as the new post-enlargement “avant-garde”. In the convention 
negotiations about the new EU treaty the accession countries are facing 
an integration dilemma, to some extent reminding us of the soft 
euro-sceptical attitudes to the EU in the Scandinavian countries and the 
United Kingdom.
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5. Morę about the agricultural chapter, 
finance and budget
From the outset, the problems in the agriculture chapter were difficult 
to resolve. They were also affected by the frequent changes of agricul­
tural policy from the union side. Thus, the agricultural chapter was 
clearly one of the main negotiating problems (“high politics”) and for 
that reason became the object of tough Interstate negotiations, i.e. a high 
preference intensity, to use one of the concepts put forward by 
neo-liberalists. From the outset, the prospects for getting side-payments 
due to concessions on agricultural policy (the 10 year transition period) 
were modest, primarily because of the Iow influence capability and the 
policy of acąuiescence of the accession countries. As the largest country, 
Poland tried to follow a balancing policy, but did not succeed. However, 
it was decided that some payments from the EU, intended to be given to 
organie farming in the accession countries, could be given to farmers as 
direct payments.
In the endgame, the negotiations were especially hard regarding very 
specific issues, like milk ąuotas and the amount and timing of money 
transfers. Thus, in agriculture, both member states and candidate coun­
tries held out until the last minutę. The turning points were the accep- 
tance by the EU-15 of the Commissions proposal about a 10 year transi­
tion period before the accession countries received direct payments to 
farmers on an eąual footing with the EU-15 countries, and secondly the 
acceptance of the German-French proposal about “freezing” the expendi- 
ture on the common agricultural policy (CAP) from the year 2006.
The two biggest players were Germany and France, who argued that 
the later, “softer” package proposed by the Danish presidency offered too 
much to Poland, e.g. on converting structural orientated economic sup- 
port for farmers to direct payments and renationalising some of the agri­
cultural support for farmers, and too little to German and French farm­
ers. In the end, during the Copenhagen summit the Germans gave some 
concessions as regards finance and budget, however, mostly in the shape 
of “speeding up” payments from the EU structural and regional funds. 
Tied up with this was the generał issue of financial compensation, the 
new member states did not want to be worse off after they joined the 
Union than before it.
6. Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we can say that the Danish EU Presidency was success- 
ful, at least as regards the topie that had top priority for the Danes, the
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enlargement of the EU to the east. The 7Danish chairmanship was of 
the consensual type, aimed at finding a “two-level compromise”, on one 
hand between the EU-15 countries themselves and on the other between 
the EU-15 and the accession countries. Furthermore, the aim of the 
Danish government was to increase the control capacity, thus paving the 
way for removing the Danish opt-out.
The argument that the EU Chairmanship in some cases is better han- 
dled by smali States has been confirmed in the case of the Danish chair­
manship. Denmark did not need to act in “entrepreneurial” ways by rais- 
ing new subjects on the agenda, mainly due to the significance of the 
enlargement ąuestion to the Danish government (and population). Fur­
thermore, Denmark was not motivated to be “consolidating”, i.e. deepen- 
ing integration by institutional reforms, due to the Danish opt-out and 
widespread euro-scepticism in the Danish population as regards further 
integration and federalisation of the EU. Anyway, the end gamę of the 
negotiations about the new EU treaty at the EU Convention will take 
place after the Danish Chairmanship.
As we have seen, Denmark took over the chairmanship at the end of 
the “inside-outside enlargement gamę” and under intensive time pres- 
sure. In the light of the responsibilities of the chairing countries, we can 
conclude that “chairmanship” (and the Commission) do (at least to some 
extent) matter” when forging inter-state compromises. In the end gamę 
(and inside-outside gamę) most subjects for negotiations constituted 
“high politics”, if we use the neo-liberal intergovernmentalist terminol- 
ogy, including the budget and agriculture. For these reasons those nego­
tiations were inter-state characterised by a high preference intensity 
and the important role played by the two “core EU-countries”, France 
and Germany, as regards closing the chapters on agriculture and the 
budget. Thus, the breakthrough in the negotiations was due to two pro- 
posal from Germany, first in the shape of the French-German initia- 
tive on freezing the expenditure on CAP from 2006, and second in the 
shape of the German financial “offer” to Poland during the summit in 
Copenhagen.
Unlike during the Belgian chairmanship, no external shocks (if we ex- 
clude the terrorist act in Moscow in October 2002 and its negative im- 
pact on Danish-Russian relations) disturbed the performance of the 
presidency. A war in Iraq could have constituted an external shock. The 
handling of the enlargement negotiations by the Danish chairmanship 
are considered as successful by external and internal observers, criticism 
from the side of the opposition in the Danish parliament has mostly fo- 
cused on other topics, e.g. food and animal safety, taxation, in which 
cases concrete results have been less visible or even missing.
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